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RECONCILING SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS WITH 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AFTER 
MALLAK AND SULAIMON 
INTRODUCTION 
Citizenship regimes are among the clearest expressions of the "public 
philosophy" of States, 1 with national identity, sovereignty and historical 
experience shaping the legal rules for attribution of citizenship.2 From the 
perspective of the individual, despite developments in universal human 
rights law, citizenship also remains the key to full security of legal status and 
residence in modem States as well as access to the "tangible benefits"3 arising 
from the range of social, economic and political rights held by citizens. The 
significance of citizenship in Irish legal and political discourse became clear in 
the course of the debates on the 2004 referendum, which removed the automatic 
right to citizenship for all children born on the island of Ireland-a right that 
had been constitutionalised (on foot of the Belfast Agreement) only six years 
previously.4 More recently, the establishment of "citizenship ceremonies" for 
newly naturalised citizens marks the legal and social significance of joining 
the Irish polity.5 
Since 2004, most likely reflecting the decline in inward migration in recent 
years, relatively little public attention has been focused on citizenship law 
in Ireland. However, questions around the application of the naturalisation 
rules in individual cases have consistently come before the High Court in the 
form of judicial review proceedings. The most striking feature of Ireland's 
naturalisation regime is the extent to which it is characterised by ministerial 
discretion. As will be seen below, most of the High Court jurisprudence has 
recognised and reinforced this extensive discretion, the courts seemingly 
1. This phrase is borrowed from Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration 
and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001). 
2. See Rogers Brubaker's seminal work, Citizenship and Yationhood in France and 
Germany (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
3. R. v Secretary of State ex parte Fayed [1998]1 W.L.R. 763 at 773. 
4. By way of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution Act 1998. For commentary on 
these issues, see, for example, Siobhan Mullally, "Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: 
asking the Question 'Who Belongs'?" (2005) 25 Legal Studies 578; Steve Garner, "Babies, 
Bodies and Entitlement: Gendered Aspects of Access to Citizenship in the Republic of 
Ireland" (2007) 60(3) Parliamentary Affairs 437; Donncha O'Connell and Ciara Smyth, 
"The Constitution and Family Rights" in Ursula Fraser and Colin Harvey ( eds ), Sanctuary 
in Ireland? Perspectives on Asylum Law and Policy (Dublin: IPA, 2003); Bryan Fanning 
and Fidele Mustawaribo, "The Citizenship Referendtun" in Bryan Fanning (ed.), Xew 
Guests of the Irish Nation (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009). 
5. The citizenship ceremony was enshrined in primary legislation by the Civil Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011. See also, comments of Minister for Justice and 
Equality Alan Shatter in written answer to Parliamentary Question of Deputy Mac 
Lochlainn, Questions 470 and 471, 773 Did! Eireann 12, October 9, 2012. 
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constrained by the statutory preservation of "absolute" discretion in this 
sphere and endorsing a state-centred citizenship paradigm which effectively 
eliminates the perspective of the migrant seeking Irish nationality. The space 
for the contestation of decisions by individual applicants is consequently very 
narrow, reflecting what Mullally has described as "a pattern of exclusion that 
has permeated official discourse on immigration for many years".6 
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in December 2012, however, 
may signal a move away from this paradigm. In Mallak v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform,7 the court found that the Minister for Justice had a 
general duty to provide reasons forrefusingto grant a certificate ofnaturalisation. 
While the Mallak case thus deals with classic issues of administrative law, this 
article focuses on its impact on the citizenship regime. Two weeks later, in 
Sulaimon v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,8 the court severely 
criticised the "contrived" nature of ministerial and departmental attempts to 
deny a young boy birthright citizenship on the basis of their calculation of the 
residence ofhis father. 
These cases (Mallak, in particular) provide much-needed protection for 
individual applicants engaging with the sovereign power of the State. Here, 
it is argued that their significance lies in the broad implications of the move 
away from a purely State-centred, sovereignty-based approach to citizenship. 
While it will be seen that the decisions themselves focus on a traditional 
rule of law rationale, common to much administrative law jurisprudence, it 
is suggested that this shift has been, and will continue to be, influenced by 
developments in EU law and under the ECHR, and provides a way forward for 
a more human rights-oriented approach to the attribution of citizenship in Irish 
law. This article will outline the decisions in Mallak and Sulaimon, drawing 
particular attention to the Supreme Court's criticisms of the administration of 
the citizenship process. It will then explore the erosion of national discretion in 
the sphere of citizenship by EU law and recent ECHR case law. Before this, it 
will briefly set out the law relating to birthright citizenship and naturalisation. 
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALISATION IN IRISH LAW 
The two main ways by which citizenship is acquired in Ireland are at birth or 
by way of naturalisation. In respect of birthright citizenship, the legislative 
provisions enshrine a mixture of a jus sanguinis and a jus soli approach. 
Broadly speaking, citizenship is acquired by descent by those with an Irish 
citizen parent.9 A more complex picture emerges for children born in Ireland to 
6. Siobhan Mullally, "Defining the Limits to Citizenship: Family Life, Immigration and 
Non-Nationals in Irish Law" (2004) 37 Irish Jurist 334. See also, Bryan Fanning and 
Fidele Mustawaribo, "Nationals/Non-Nationals: Immigration, Citizenship and Politics in 
the Republic oflreland" (2007) 30(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 439. 
7. [2012] IESC 59. 
8. [2012] IESC 63. 
9. Sections 6, 7 and 11 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended) (the 
"1956 Act"). 
non-citizen p< 
Act 1956 (as i 
a person is n< 
"during the P' 
resident in the 
the aggregate 
referendum, c 
the jus soli ele 
this, Steve Ga 
essence that c< 
While the< 
attitudes to po 
generally acqu 
as amended, g< 
Citizenship is 
the Minister11 . 
s.15. These an 
period of one ~ 
application an< 
to reside in the 
nation and loya 
of the Minister 
on satisfaction 
a Minister is gr 
in his absolute 
THENA: 
INDI\ 
Research cond 
applicants hav< 
service in the c 
serious concen 
within the sy~ 
naturalisation r 
of naturalisatioJ 
10. Steve Garner 
Citizenship in 
11. Section 14 of 
12. "Reckonable 
citizenship, ar: 
13. The unusual n 
Justice, Equal 
14. Immigrant Co 
Naturalisation 
:liscrction in this 
which effectively 
mality. The space 
~onsequently very 
of exclusion that 
~ars". 6 
r 2012, however, 
nister for Justice, 
· for Justice had a 
: ofnaturalisation. 
tistrative law, this 
o weeks later, in 
he court severely 
ental attempts to 
:alculation of the 
:d protection for 
·the State. Here, 
ons of the move 
:h to citizenship. 
on a traditional 
jurisprudence, it 
e, influenced by 
way forward for 
tizenship in Irish 
laimon, drawing 
tdministration of 
mal discretion in 
w. Before this, it 
d naturalisation. 
N IRISH LAW 
td are at birth or 
, the legislative 
· soli approach. 
>e with an Irish 
om in Ireh.md to 
, Immigration and 
~ryan Fanning and 
;hip and Politics in 
(as amended) (the 
Short Articles and Comments 195 
non-citizen parents. Pursuant to s.6A of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship 
Act 1956 (as inserted by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004), such 
a person is not entitled to citizenship unless one of his or her parents has, 
"during the period of 4 years immediately preceding the person's birth, been 
resident in the island of Ireland for a period of not less than 3 years or periods 
the aggregate of which is not less than 3 years". Thus, following the 2004 
referendum, citizenship for such persons born in Ireland is not automatic and 
the jus soli element of the regime has been significantly diluted. The result of 
this, Steve Garner argues, is that an entitlement to "Irishness" is primarily an 
essence that can be transmitted genetically. 10 
While the acquisition of citizenship at birth is often seen as symbolic of 
attitudes to political and social membership, "first-generation" migrants will 
generally acquire citizenship through naturalisation. Part III of the 1956 Act, 
as amended, governs the acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation in Ireland. 
Citizenship is conferred by means of a certificate of naturalisation granted by 
the Minister11 and the conditions for the issue of this certificate are set out in 
s.l5. These are that the applicant is of full age, of good character, has had a 
period of one year's continuous residence in the State immediately before the 
application and four years' residence out of the previous eight years, 12 intends 
to reside in the State after naturalisation and has made an oath of fidelity to the 
nation and loyalty to the State. Section 15 provides for the "absolute discretion" 
of the Minister in deciding whether to grant the application for naturalisation 
on satisfaction of these conditions-one of the few instances in Irish law where 
a Minister is granted the sole power of deciding the outcome of an application 
in his absolute discretion. 13 
THE NATURALISATION CASES: VULNERABILITY OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN THE FACE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Research conducted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland suggests that 
applicants have very varied experiences of processing times and customer 
service in the course of the naturalisation process, and many have expressed 
serious concerns in relation to the lack of transparency in decision-making 
within the system. 14 The level of ministerial discretion permeating the 
naturalisation rules stems from the principle that the granting of a certificate 
of naturalisation under Irish law is not a right to which a person who appears 
10. Steve Gamer, "Babies, Bodies and Entitlement: Gendered Aspects of Access to 
Citizenship in the Republic of Ireland" (2007) 60(3) Parliamentary Affairs 437 at 443. 
11. Section 14 ofthe 1956Act. 
12. "Reckonable residence" is an important concept here as in the context of birthright 
citizenship, and is detailed in s.6B of the 1956 Act. 
13. The unusual nature of the power was pointed out by Clark J. in Abuissa v J,finister for 
Justice. Equality and Law Reform [20 1 0] IEHC 366. 
14. Immigrant Council oflreland, "Living in Limbo: Migrants' Experiences of Applying for 
Naturalisation in Ireland" (Immigration Council oflreland and NASC, 2011 ), pp.69-70. 
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to satisfy all the conditions is entitled, but rather a "privilege", 15 reflecting 
assumptions regarding the extensive powers of the State to deal with non-
citizens on which citizenship frameworks are based. This logic of "privilege" 
underpins many of the High Court judgments in this domain, which have 
emphasised that there is no "legitimate expectation" of a grant of citizenship 
consequent upon fulfilling all of the statutory criteria.16 So, for example, the 
courts have accepted that, in exercising this absolute discretion, the Minister 
is entitled to take into account public policy considerations, including in 
relation to immigration policy, which may have little to do with the facts in 
the individual case. 17 It also seems that the courts will decline to review a 
decision in a situation where the applicant may have an opportunity to make 
a fresh application to the Minister. 18 The courts will not interfere with the 
primary role of the Minister in assessing international law considerations 
relating to citizenship applications, even where key human rights issues such 
as Statelessness are involved. 19 Moreover, the approach of the High Court in 
numerous cases was that the Minister is not obliged to give reasons for his 
decision due to the absolute nature of his discretion.20 
Despite the general thrust of the judgments, there have been cases in which 
the Minister's decision to refuse to grant a certificate of naturalisation has 
been quashed, a number of these involving refusals on the basis of the "good 
character" requirement. The wide margin of appreciation given to the State and 
the subjective nature of the concept of"good character" offers to the State, via 
the Minister, a means of flexing its sovereignty and highlights the vulnerability 
of the migrant individual in the face of the State.21 Reflecting this vulnerability, 
the lack of information given to applicants on the requirement has been 
identified as a serious deficiency of the naturalisation process.22 Some limits to 
the powers of the Minister in considering the good character of the applicant 
have, however, been identified. In Hussain v Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform,23 for example, Hogan J. made some strong statements on 
the importance of fairness in the naturalisation procedure. He found that 
an applicant cannot be disqualified from naturalisation merely because he 
15. This was emphasised by the High Court in, inter alia, Robert and Muresan v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, unreported, High Court, Peart J., February II, 2004, 
and by the Supreme Court in }vfallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2012] IESC 59. 
16. Robert and Muresan v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, unreported, High 
Court, Peart J., February 11, 2004. 
17. In J1ishra v Minister for Justice (1996]1 I.R. 189, Kelly J. observed that the Minister was 
entitled to adopt a general policy not to naturalise people who would be unemployable in 
their chosen profession and would therefore emigrate after naturalisation (although the 
application of the policy gave rise to a legitimate complaint, in this case). 
18. Spila v Minister for Justice, Law Reform and Equality [2012] IEHC 366 at paras 19, 20. 
19. Fn.18, paras 15, 16. 
20. See, inter alia,Abuissa v J1inister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 366. 
21. Sergio Carrera, In Search of the Pe1ject Citizen? The Intersection between Integration, 
Immigration and .Vationality in then.; (Lei den: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), p.443. 
22. ICI, fn.l4, at 71. 
23. [2011] IEHC 171. 
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or she has come to adverse Garda attention, and that (in the circumstances) 
the Minister had erred in failing to disclose the Garda report to the applicant 
for his comment as a matter of fair procedures before reaching an adverse 
decision on his application. Hogan J. made it quite clear that the "absolute 
discretion" conferred on the Minister did not mean that the Minister was freed 
from adherence to the obligations of the rule oflaw, as "this would not only be 
inconsistent with the rule of law, but it would be at odds with the guarantee of 
democratic government contained in Article 5 ofthe Constitution". 24 While the 
court's insistence on the importance of fair procedures in Hussain suggested a 
more rights-based approach, the applicant in Ma!lak met with little success in 
the High Court in trying to challenge the view that the Minister had no duty to 
give reasons in these cases. 25 The applicant, Mr Mallak, was a Syrian national 
who had been awarded refugee stahls in 2002. 'When he and his wife applied for 
citizenship in 2005, his wife's application was accepted while his was rejected. 
The Minister relied on his absolute discretion and refused to give reasons for 
this decision. Cooke J. in the High Court dismissed the application for judicial 
review, following the well-worn argument that the absolute discretion of the 
Minister meant that he was not obliged to give reasons. He rejected arguments 
based on art.l3 of the ECHR and the right to an effective remedy, grounding 
his reasoning on the view that that the refusal of the certificate in no way alters 
the position or status of the applicant, meaning that there was no wrong to 
remedy.26 Cooke J. also explicitly rejected the idea that a decision under s.l5 
would engage EU law on the basis that the denial of Irish citizenship entailed 
the denial of EU citizenship. 27 
THE DECISION IN MALLAK 
Mr Mallak appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that s.l5, in so far as it 
provides that the Minister may refuse to grant a certificate of naturalisation in 
his absolute discretion (i.e. without giving reasons), is unconstihltional; that 
the section should be interpreted in the sense that the Minister is obliged to 
give reasons; and that the decision of the Minister to grant or refuse a certificate 
of nahlralisation is a decision regarding the acquisition of citizenship of the 
European Union to which general principles of EU law apply (and, thus, that 
the Minister was obliged to give reasons). The Supreme Court considered the 
second point of the appeal first. 
Fennelly J., delivering the judgment of the court, reaffirmed the principle 
that there exists no "right" to citizenship for those who fulfil the statutory 
criteria. 28 However, the court found, this did not mean that he enjoys "inferior 
legal protection" when pursuing the application, and neither did the fact that 
24. Fn.23, para.17. 
25. "'vfallak v }Jinister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [20 11] IEHC 306. 
26. Fn.25, para.17. 
27. Fn.25, para.31. 
28. J,fallak v 'vfinister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [20 12] IESC 59 at para.46. 
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he was a non-national.29 On reviewing the evolution of Superior Courts' 
judgments over a 30-year period, Fennelly J. considered that: 
"In the present state of evolution of our law, it is not easy to conceive of 
a decision-maker being dispensed from giving an explanation either of 
the decision or of the decision-making process at some stage. The most 
obvious means of achieving fairness is for reasons to accompany the 
decision. However, it is not a matter of complying with a formal rule: 
the underlying objective is the attainment of fairness in the process."30 
Philosophically, the court centred its rationale on the idea of the rule of law, 
rather than on realising the rights of the individual applicant, citing Hogan J. 
in Hussain to the effect that the legislative provision for absolute discretion 
cannot mean that "the Minister is free to act in an arbitrary and autocratic 
fashion". 31 In this way, it was sought to reconcile the sovereignty claims ofthe 
State with the rights of the individual. This replicates the careful approach of 
the Supreme Court in In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the 
Matter of ss. 5 and 10 of the Illegal immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999,32 of 
deriving the protection of the rights of non-nationals in certain circumstances 
from the obligations of a State founded on the rule of law, rather than on 
the basis of personal rights. Despite this continuing refusal to recognise the 
"humanity of the stranger"33 in terms of providing full rights protection fo:r 
"non-nationals", however, the effect of the judgment is to require a higher level 
of protection, at least in relation to fair procedures rights, for those within the 
citizenship process. 
CRITICISING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP REGIME 
In Mallak, the court noted that the Minister had not suggested that there were 
any reasons relating to the appellant's character which could justify refusing 
him naturalisation or that he posed any threat to national security or public 
policy, and that the applicant's wife had been granted citizenship.34 Refraining 
from being too openly critical of the Minister, Fennelly J. simply observed that: 
"One can understand the appellant being mystified."35 A week later, another 
citizenship case came before the Supreme Court,36 in which a father sought 
to claim birthright citizenship for his son37 on the basis that he (the father) 
29. Note 28 at para.46, refening to In the matter ofArticle 26 of the Constitution and in the 
matter ojss. 5 and 10 of the Illegal immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 [2000]2 I.R. 385. 
30. Fn.28, para.66. 
31. Fn.28, para.45, citing Hussain, para.l7. 
32. [2000] 2 I.R. 385. 
33. Siobhan Mullally, "Defining the Limits to Citizenship: Family Life, Immigration and 
Non-Nationals in Irish Law", fn.7 at 336. 
34. Jfallak v J1inisterfor Justice, Equality and Lcrw Refonn [2012] IESC 59 at paras 75 and 76. 
35. Fn.34, para.76. 
36. Sulaimon v Jfinisterfor Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 63. 
37. Under the tenns of s.6A of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, as amended. 
had satisfied t 
of the son's bi 
days short of tl 
immigration Ia 
remain had bee 
that a letter rec 
than the date o: 
The severit: 
the Minister b: 
application anc 
judgments on i 
concurring judJ 
"I simply 
long ape 
he has be 
father an• 
to the ch 
taxpayers 
The corresponc 
(delivering the 
fusing", 39 and t 
and artificial ar1 
unacceptable. 40 
back" from the 
followed by the 
a view to denyi1 
THEINFLUE 
Cooke J. in the 
the decision oft 
was obliged to 
38. Sulaimon v J1h 
J., para.24. 
39. Sulaimon v JljiJ 
J., para.!O. 
40. Sulaimon v Jfil 
J., para.9. 
41. This phrase is 
deportation jm 
and the limits , 
Law Review 4~ 
42. Rottmann (C-1 
Superior Courts' 
sy to conceive of 
lanation either of 
: stage. The most 
J accompany the 
th a formal rule: 
. the process."30 
f the rule of law, 
, citing Hogan J. 
,solute discretion 
0' and autocratic 
~nty claims of the 
reful approach of 
itution and in the 
U Bill, 1999,32 of 
1in circumstances 
v, rather than on 
to recognise the 
tts protection for 
1ire a higher level 
· those within the 
'l'SHIP REGIME 
:d that there were 
i justify refusing 
ecurity or public 
;hip.34 Refraining 
Jly observed that: 
:ek later, another 
1 a father sought 
1t he (the father) 
nstitution and in the 
99 [2000]2 I.R. 385. 
fe, Immigration and 
9 at paras 75 and 76. 
ESC 63. 
t 1956, as amended. 
Short Articles and Comments 199 
had satisfied the three-year lawful residence period in the State at the date 
of the son's birth. His application was refused on the basis that he was three 
days short of the required time period. The case turned on a technical point of 
immigration law concerning the date on which the father's legal permission to 
remain had been granted, with the Supreme Court finding in favour of the child 
that a letter received by the father constituted the permission to remain, rather 
than the date on which the relevant stamp was placed in the father's passport. 
The severity of the criticism which was levelled at the Department and 
the Minister by the court in Sulaimon, in terms of both the handling of the 
application and the subsequent litigation, was very unusual in the context of 
judgments on immigration and nationality law. Hardiman J., in delivering his 
concurring judgment, was particularly vocal, stating: 
"I simply do not understand why so great an effort has been made over so 
long a period to deprive a small boy of citizenship in the country where 
he has been permitted to reside all his life, a citizenship enjoyed by his 
father and his sister. If there is a point to the pain and anxiety caused 
to the child's family, the expense to which they have been put and the 
taxpayers money which has been spent, it entirely eludes me."38 
The correspondence received by the father was described by O'Donnell J. 
(delivering the judgment of the five-judge court) as "confused and con-
fusing",39 and the conduct of the litigation, during which "highly contrived 
and artificial arguments" were advanced on behalf of the Minister, was seen as 
unacceptable. 40 Sulaimon thus provides further evidence of a degree of "push 
back" from the Supreme Court against the "excessive formalism" 41 sometimes 
followed by the Department and the Minister in the naturalisation process with 
a view to denying citizenship to applicants. 
THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: EROSION 
OF NATIONAL DISCRETION? 
Cooke J. in the High Court in Mallak had dismissed the argument, based on 
the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rottmann,42 that the Minister 
was obliged to make his decision in compliance with the general principles 
38. Sulaimon v Jlinister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 63, per Hardiman 
1., para.24. 
39. Sulaimon v .vfinister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 63, per O'Donnell 
J., para.10. 
40. Sulaimon v .\1inister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 63, per O'Donnell 
J., para.9. 
41. This phrase is borrowed by Mullally from European Court of Human Rights article 8 
deportation jurisprudence. Siobhan Mullally, "Citizen children, 'impossible subjects' 
and the limits of migrant family rights in Ireland" (20 11) (I) European Human Rights 
Law Review 43 at 50. 
42. Rottmann (C-135/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-1449. 
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of EU law.43 The Supreme Court did not consider the EU law point as the 
case was resolved on the administrative law grounds of the appeal and the 
court did not therefore go on to consider the constitutional and EU arguments. 
Nonetheless, one of the most interesting aspects of the judgment is the "several 
converging legal sources" which Fennelly J. referred to in support of the court's 
conclusions on the duty to give reasons. These included Irish legislation,44 UK 
case law45 and, most significantly, EU law. Together, art.296 of the TFEU,46 
art.41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 47 and the Court of Justice 
decision in Council v Bamba,48 were taken as reinforcing the general duty to 
give reasons. 
In Rottmann, the Court of Justice found that the decision to withdraw 
national citizenship from a person which has the knock-on effect of the loss of 
Union citizenship came within the ambit ofEU law,49 and that the national court 
should use a proportionality test "to ascertain whether the withdrawal decision 
at issue ... observes the principle of proportionality so far as it concerns the 
consequences it entails for the situation of the person concerned in the light 
of EU law". 50 The decision in Rottmann was welcomed as a "milestone" 51 in 
nationality law. 52 As well as proportionality, rules concerning national citizens 
which fall within the ambit ofEU law must also respect the general principles 
of EU law, including the prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of 
race, religion, ethnicity, sex, sexuality, disability and age. Among the many 
questions raised by Rottmann is the extent ofthe restraint which EU law places 
on the scope of Member States' discretion in applying national rules on the 
acquisition (rather than loss) of nationality. While the full impact and reach 
of the court's approach in Rottmann remains to be seen, it certainly opens 
up Member State nationality laws to greater scrutiny, and a proportionality 
analysis. The intrusion of the "external" influence of EU law into a domain 
which is perceived to be the paradigm expression of national sovereignty 
can only be a good thing for individual migrants seeking access points to the 
polities ofEU States. 
43. Fn.42, para.31. 
44. Section 18( 1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1997. 
45. RvSecretmyofStateexpFayed[1998]1 W.L.R. 763. 
46. The second sentence of which provides: "Legal acts shall state the reasons on which 
they are based ... ". 
47. Art.41(2) refers to the "Obligation of the administration to give reasons for its deci-
sions". 
48. Council v Bomba (C-417/11), Judgment of the CJEU ofNovember 15, 2012. 
49. Rottmann (C-135/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-1449, para.42. 
50. Fn.49, para.54. 
51. Rene De Groot and Anja Seling, "Court of Justice of tbe European Union decision of 2 
March 2010, Case C-315/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern ca.Se note 2: the conse-
quences of the Rottmann judgment on Member State autonomy-the European Court of 
Justice's avant-gardism in nationality matters" (2011) 7(1) Eur Cons! L.R. 150 at 451. 
52. Jo Shaw, "Concluding thoughts: Rottmann in context" in Jo Shaw (ed.), Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged J1ember State Sovereignty in _\'ationality Law? 
(EUI Florence, RSCAS 20 11/62), p.33 at 41. 
In a pa 
that citize 
test. In G 
which stat 
only if the 
conjunctic 
that the irr 
as to brin~ 
that the n 
naturalisat 
developmt 
Irish law 1 
State and il 
particular!: 
discussed 
be treated 
citizenship 
Mallak in 1 
is realised 
reveal an iJ 
with withi1 
go in orde1 
a long-tern 
Court's op' 
citizenship 
in the High 
"The 
first l 
is an 
will t 
whicl 
matte 
that i 
that i1 
mayl 
apply 
53. App. No. 
54. See geneJ 
Article 8: 
and Law 
55. [2011] IE 
U law point as the 
the appeal and the 
and EU arguments. 
nent is the "several 
1pport of the court's 
;h legislation,44 UK 
~96 of the TFEU,46 
1e Court of Justice 
the general duty to 
:ision to withdraw 
effect of the loss of 
1t the national court 
rithdrawal decision 
· as it concerns the 
cerned in the light 
, a "milestone"51 in 
1g national citizens 
; general principles 
on the grounds of 
Among the many 
hich EU law places 
tiona! rules on the 
I impact and reach 
it certainly opens 
i a proportionality 
law into a domain 
1tional sovereignty 
. ccess points to the 
the reasons on which 
; reasons for its deci-
;r 15,2012. 
n Union decision of 2 
a5e note 2: the conse-
the European Court of 
.st L.R. 150 at 451. 
Shaw (ed.), Has the 
v in "\'ationality Law? 
Short Articles and Comments 201 
In a parallel development, the European Court of Human Rights has found 
that citizenship is a facet of private life and is thus open to a proportionality 
test. In Genovese v Malta,' 3 the court found that provisions of Maltese law 
which stated that children born out of wedlock would be eligible for citizenship 
only if their mother was Maltese were in breach of art.l4 of the ECHR, read in 
conjunction with art.8.54 This case is most significant for its clear recognition 
that the impact of. the right to citizenship on the child's social identity was such 
as to bring that right within the general scope and ambit of art.8. It illustrates 
that the margin of appreciation allowed to States in defining the terms of 
naturalisation is not unlimited and could form a platform for a more nuanced 
development of the case law relating to discrimination in nationality law. 
CONCLUSION 
Irish law has in recent times enshrined a paradigm of relations between the 
State and its migrants which centres on control, security and executive power-
particularly in the domain of citizenship law. The Supreme Court decisions 
discussed in this article, with their requirement that non-national applicants 
be treated with a basic degree of fairness, even in the sovereignty-dominated 
citizenship sphere, evidence a shift away from this. Whether the promise of 
Mal!ak in terms of enhancing the transparency of the naturalisation procedure 
is realised remains to be seen. However, both the judgments examined here 
reveal an impatience with the way in which individual applicants can be dealt 
with within the process and the lengths to which the State has been seen to 
go in order to deny citizenship, even to those who have been settled here on 
a long-term basis with naturalised family members. In addition, the Supreme 
Court's openness to external legal sources in considering matters related to 
citizenship stood in stark contrast to the inward-looking approach of Cooke J . 
in the High Court, who stated: 
"There is, in the view of the Court, one general observation which must 
first be made by way of preface to any consideration of these issues. It 
is an exercise of the State's sovereign authority to decide which persons 
will be permitted to enter its territory and the terms and conditions upon 
which they may be granted leave to remain or to reside. On the specific 
matter of citizenship, it is established and recognised in international law 
that it is one of the fundamental incidents of the sovereignty of a state 
that it alone can decide which persons will be its citizens; which persons 
may be admitted to its citizenship and the terms and criteria which it will 
apply for that purpose."55 
53. App. No. 53124/09, Judgment of October 11,2012. 
54. See generally, Rene De Groot and Olivier Vonk, "Nationality, Statelessness and ECHR's 
Article 8: Comments on Genovese v Jialta" (20 12) 14(3) European Journal oj}vfigration 
and Law 317. 
55. [2011]IEHC306atpara.9. 
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The approach of the Supreme Court could be seen as a side-effect of the 
increasing scrutiny to which national citizenship law may be subject in light 
of decisions like Rottmann and Genovese v Malta. In any case, this refreshing 
openness, together with developments in nationality law in EU law and under 
the ECHR, could herald the beginnings of the development of a more rights-
based approach to citizenship generally. 
Dr Cliodhna Murphy 
Lecturer in Law, DCU 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MENTAL DISORDER AND 
THE ACT OF KILLING IN THE DEFENCE OF DIMINISHED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
In light of the Court of Criminal Appeal judgment in DPP v Tomkins, 1 it is 
worth highlighting uncertainty in the scope of the defence of diminished 
responsibility in Irish law. This statutory defence reduces murder liability to 
manslaughter. It applies under s.6 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 
(the "2006 Act") where a person kills another while suffering from a mental 
disorder that falls short of founding an insanity defence, but which nevertheless 
substantially diminishes the person's responsibility for the act of killing. An 
uncertain aspect of the defence is the connection required between the mental 
disorder that the defendant suffered from and his or her act of killing. 2 The 
question is whether, or to what extent, the mental disorder must cause or 
otherwise explain the killing in order for the defence to apply. The scope of the 
diminished responsibility defence varies greatly depending on the answer to this 
question. After a brief overview of the diminished responsibility defence and 
the Tomkins case, I set out different potential understandings of the connection 
between mental disorder and killing and identifY what can be learned from 
Tomkins and other cases. I argue that it is important and appropriate for the 
Court of Criminal Appeal to settle the precise scope of the defence, and simply 
repeating the language of the statute will not achieve this. 
1. [2012] IECCA 82. 
2. As identified in Louise Kennefick, "Diminished responsibility in Ireland: historical 
reflections on the doctrine and present-day analysis of the law" (2011) 62 N.I.L.Q. 269 at 
285-286. 
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